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The Social Scientist, the Public, and
the Pragmatist Gaze
Exploring the Critical Conditions of Sociological Inquiry
Philippe Gonzalez and Laurence Kaufmann
The public compose a tribunal, which is more
powerful than all the other tribunals together.
J. Bentham ([1791] 1843), An Essay on Political Tactics
1 Within the last decades, a “pragmatic” – if not “pragmatist” – turn has taken place in the
French social sciences, bringing about new ways of inquiry to empirical fields such as
religious conversion, judicial trial, scientific controversy, or media coverage. Although
diverse and sometimes diverging, those approaches share an important common feature,
already present in the classical pragmatism initiated, among others, by Charles S. Peirce,
William James,  John Dewey,  or  George H. Mead.  Instead  of  starting  either  from  the
individual or the social structure in order to subsequently establish how both could be
related, they take action itself as their point of departure. The social order is thus said to
be  the  practical  accomplishment  of  ordinary  agents  who constitute  and maintain  in
common the world they live in. But this common focus on action is very vague – vague
enough, at least, to give rise to the various interpretations that the profusion of different
action-centered schools of thought makes explicit, from “pragmatic” to “pragmatist” to
“praxeological.” In fact, each of the main schools favors one specific aspect of action that
is worth dwelling upon: (a) the central part played by action in the production of social
order and the indeterminacy of human agency, mostly stressed by ethnomethodology and
praxeological sociology (b) the performative power of language and actantial schemes to
structure and institute social action and relationships, mainly focused on by linguistic
pragmatics  (c)  the  epistemological  primacy of  practices  and the  importance,  for  the
making of a public, of a common, “bottom-up” inquiry into the indirect consequences of
transactions, mostly emphasized by philosophical pragmatism.
2 Interestingly, several aspects of action that we shortly introduced above are found in
pragmatic sociology [sociologie pragmatique], the French fruitful research program initiated
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in the 1990’s by its leading figures, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, which directly
influenced a generation of young researchers.1 Pragmatic sociology will be our starting
point not only because it is one of the most promising sociological schools which have
emerged during the last decades, but also because it tries to reconcile a view that stresses
the structural organization of the worlds of action with a view that emphasizes human
agency and the formation of meaning in situation. Moreover, as will be seen, pragmatic
sociology insists on the laypersons’ critical capacity to call into question the norms and
values that are supposed to be carried out in a given course of action.2 In short, pragmatic
sociology,  which is also called “sociology of critique,” tries to leave aside the distant
standpoint of critical sociology, such as that of Pierre Bourdieu, which entails the well-
known epistemological break with commonsense and thereby the pre-dominance of the
view of the sociologist over that of the social actor. Instead, pragmatic sociology tries to
bring to light the “capacity to judge” and to criticize that ordinary actors themselves
possess. Importantly, such capacity of critique is endogenous but also plural: whereas
critical sociology aims at unveiling domination as if it were just one single, monolithic
order, agents navigate plural orders of worth and hence have at their disposal different
kinds of resources for criticism. So critique does not depend upon a unique operation of
critical totalization, exerted from the external standpoint of the social scientist.  Each
order  of  worth  is  vulnerable  to  its  own  internal  critique  and  to  the  constraints  of
justification that go with it. 
3 Obviously, the attention, in pragmatic sociology, to the capacity of ordinary people to
resort to critical judgment and to be concerned with the justification for the common
good that  is  at  stake  in  a  given  world  of  action,  is  in  phase  with  the  insistence  of
philosophical pragmatism on the role of doubt, inquiry and experience in human activity
and, above all, in modern democracy – even if effective references to this philosophy are
very scarce.3 But despite this strong family resemblance, pragmatic sociology seems to
remain at the threshold of philosophical pragmatism, mainly with regard to the issue of
the making of a public and the status of public inquiry. Indeed, this latter emphasizes the
moral and political necessity, for scientists, politicians and ordinary citizens, to take into
account the indirect consequences of their own activities on others, and to allow those
who are affected by these very consequences to launch a public inquiry. Philosophical
pragmatism is thus underlain by a political model of the community as a whole whose
normative  dimension  is  central:  only  a  demanding  participative  stance can  allow
individuals to turn their private trouble into a public problem and to enrich both the
individual and the community. But pragmatic sociology, somewhat paradoxically for a
model which greatly values justification, insists so much on the variety of the worlds of
action and their internal worths and legitimacy that it tends to leave aside the very idea
of a public sphere in which a political “meta-inquiry” into the validity of the orders of
worth, their mutual relations and their hierarchy is carried out.4 It is maybe this absence
of  explicit  normative  stance  and  this  lack  of  “meta”  standpoint  that  explains  why
Luc Boltanski, in his recent book On Critique ([2009] 2011), partially repudiates pragmatic
sociology,  which  he  initiated  himself,  and  returns  to  his  original  fascination  for
Bourdieu’s critical sociology.
4 Our paper aims at showing that such renunciation is not necessary and that pragmatic
sociology,  if  it  really  takes  seriously  the legacy of  pragmatism,  can fully  reconcile  a
pragmatic and a pragmatist way of doing sociology. Under the auspices of philosophical
pragmatism, indeed, critical inquiry can be held without reviving the external totalizing
The Social Scientist, the Public, and the Pragmatist Gaze
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
2
point  of  view of  the  critical  sociologist.  As  we will  see,  philosophers  such as  Dewey
provide  the  normative  tools  necessary  to  value  the  social  situations  triggering  the
formation of a public, that is, the formation of a “community of those indirectly affected”
which  succeeds  in  becoming  a  “community  of  investigators.”  Such  tools  allow
distinguishing  “public-triggering”  configurations  from “publicidal” configurations  that
eclipse the “bottom-up” and publicizing movement that should enable ordinary people to
make sense of the systemic interdependencies they are entangled in (Dayan 2001).
5 To tackle the issue of critical inquiry, our investigation will make a detour via two French
authors  who  exerted  a  great  influence  on  the  social  scientists  participating  in  the
pragmatic turn. Thus Jeanne Favret-Saada’s work on contemporary witchcraft, and Michel
de Certeau’s study on 17th Century possessions will prove astonishingly similar to, and
compatible with, the perspectives advanced by pragmatist philosophers, especially John
Dewey, about experience, action, and the constitution of the public. This detour will allow
us to show that pragmatic sociology as such can be fully critical and that the revival of
the epistemological break is not a necessary step towards political awareness. But before
following the marvelous inquiries proposed by Favret-Saada and Certeau, we need to give
a better account of pragmatic sociology.
 
I. Between Action, Pragmatics and Pragmatism
6 By the late 1980’s,  some French social  scientists  influenced by analytical  philosophy,
phenomenology,  pragmatics,  and ethnomethodology tried to  rethink the relationship
between  the  individual  and  the  social  structure  in  an  altogether  different  manner.5
Instead of being an overhanging structure, the social order is said to be the practical
accomplishment  of  ordinary  agents.  While  being  roughly  along  the  same  lines,  the
ground-breaking model of “economies of worth,” published in the 1990’s, which is the
launching pad of pragmatic sociology,  is particularly interesting. Not only does it draw
from linguistic pragmatics but it also enters into resonance, in some respects, with the
spirit of philosophical pragmatism.
7 Indeed,  linguistic  pragmatics has  emphasized  the  fact  that  language,  even  when  it  is
supposedly  used to  describe a  state  of  affairs  or  to  merely  exchange information,  is
always  a  way  of  doing things  (Austin  [1962]  1975).  Language  is  not  a  transparent
representation of  the world:  it  aims at modifying the world,  not at  giving way to it.
Although  always  context-dependent,  the  use  of  linguistic  utterances  is  nevertheless
governed by constitutive rules, which establish the order of words (e.g. we cannot say “I
my vegetables  eat”),  a  system of  places  (e.g.  “to  give”  involves,  by  definition,  three
positions, the given object, the giver, and the receiver), and a public, impersonal set of
rights and obligations (e.g. if I promise to come to your party, then I have the obligation
to  come  to  your  party).  In  short,  pragmatics  articulates  syntaxical  structures  and
constitutive rules necessary for linguistic utterances to be intelligible with the context-
dependence of enunciation that characterizes language-in-action. 
8 In their theory of “economies of worth,” also called “theory of justification,” Boltanski
and Thévenot do take inspiration from pragmatics: they aim indeed at laying out, in a
grammatical form, the plural orders of worth (civic, commercial, and so on), the principles
of  evaluation  and  justification  (equality,  productivity,  and  so  on),  and  the  kinds  of
commitment (familiarity, justification, and so on) that allow the closure of what can be
envisaged or, above all, argued in a given situation (Boltanski & Thévenot [1991] 2006;
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Boltanski 1990; Thévenot 1990). Just like linguistic grammar enables speakers to create
and understand an unlimited number of utterances of their language, a “grammar-like”
system of norms, modes of engagement and principles of actions enables agents to act
appropriately in particular situations they have never encountered before. For instance,
normally competent agents master the rules that a public denunciation of injustice must
satisfy to be deemed relevant: such denunciation entails necessarily four actantial roles,
that  is,  the  ‘victim,’  the  ‘prosecutor,’  the  ‘denouncer’  and  the  ‘judge’  –  an  actorial
structure that reveals the influence of the works of Algirdas Greimas and Bruno Latour on
pragmatic sociologists (Boltanski 1993).6 Moreover, to accomplish a well-formed act of
denunciation, the plaintiff must relate himself in a credible way to a collective susceptible
to support his version of the facts and to share his indignation (e.g. a civil association)
(Boltanski et al. 1984).
9 So pragmatic sociology clearly draws from pragmatics and semiotics to highlight the
ordered set of rules, the actantial relationships, and the context-dependent spectrum of
possibilities  for  acting  that  constitute  and  map  out  ordinary  modes  of  action  and
justification.  But  it  is  also  in  phase,  although  more  tenuously,  with  philosophical
pragmatism when it insists on the dynamics and indetermination of action. Far from being
caught in a unified, highly integrated cultural and social system, people navigate plural
and distinctive action frames, made of situational constraints, material arrangements,
and above all, collective norms of qualification. Pragmatic sociology then focuses on the
situated way people agree over a frame of reference, take hold of their environment,
material as well as symbolic, and adjust their mode of engagement within the situation. In
this  indeterminate and pluralist  view of  agency,  action depends on the full  range of
competences that persons are inherently endowed with, including the cognitive and moral
ones  necessary  for  critique  and  distanciation.  Far  from being  the  ontological  dopes,
submitted  to  the  overwhelming  forces  of  the  social  order,  that  structuralist  social
sciences have portrayed them to be, social actors are thus seen as competent and critical
subjects who are able to reach agreement about the “action-that-is-suitable” and the
corresponding  “grammar”  of  values,  categories  and  beings  that  go  with  it
(Thévenot 1990).7 In case of disagreement or dispute, the interactants are able to switch
from a familiar, unquestioned regime of coordination and communication to a reflexive
regime of conflict resolution and argumentation – the so-called “regime of justification” –
which allows them to reach a new social agreement (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999).
10 Last but not least, the epistemological primacy of practices and the emphasis on human
agency  that  characterize  pragmatism  also  led  sociological  pragmatism  to  call  into
question, at least implicitly, the boundaries between knowledge and action, fact and value.8 
Since conceptual schemes give intelligibility to all our epistemic and practical relations
with the external world, direct knowledge of “what there is” turns out to be impossible:
facts  are  only  knowable  through  a  system  of  representations  and  practices  that
determines the relevant level  of  their  individuation and description.  Similarly to the
second Wittgenstein, who systematized insights very similar to those of Dewey or Peirce,
pragmatism argues that it is impossible to escape from the legislation of language and to
go outside our forms of life, governed by pragmatic rules of action and discourse. For a
neo-pragmatist  such  as  Hilary  Putnam  (1981),  even  a  basic  factual  inquiry  into  the
number of objects that are on the table in front of me cannot lead to one single truth;
indeed, to describe how many objects are on the table, we have to determine first what
counts as an object: the book as a whole or the pages that compose it? My pen or its
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constitutive parts?9 In other words, pragmatism goes necessarily with a kind of “internal
realism” that recognizes that the world can only be described “from within” a common
system  of  representations  and  practices.  It  is  this  very  system  that  enables  us  to
determine  what  counts  as  a  valuable  candidate  for  truth-and-falsity,  relevance-and-
irrelevance, or usefulness-and-uselessness (Putnam 1981). This being so, such internal or
pragmatic  realism  does  not  deny,  contrary  to  some  relativist  or  constructivist
approaches, the reality of external facts; the real world does causally contribute to our
perception and action – otherwise we could not distinguish between what is the case and
what seems to be the case. Moreover, practical dealings with the world necessarily obey
to a reality principle: practical reasoning involves by definition the functional adaptation
to real  circumstances and the anticipation of  the consequences of  one’s  own actions
(Anscombe 1957;  Ricœur 1977).  The “obdurate resistance” and partial  unpredictability
that  the world offers  to the ordinary investigations of  our surroundings do serve as
strong reality tests.10 Still, for internal realism, an external fact is not a “thing-in-itself”;
as Putnam puts it, it is endowed with an “objectivity-for-us” and depends, as such, on the
conceptual frameworks which indicate us how we should qualify it and what we should
do with it.
 
Grammar, Phenomenology, and the Difficult Status of
Critique
11 This pragmatic framework has several interesting consequences for pragmatic sociology
and, more generally, for social sciences. From a methodological point of view, only a fine-
grained ethnographical approach can account for the concrete, practical adjustments,
improvisations, micro-inquiries and critical disagreements that characterize the pluralist
way  persons  deal  with  the  world  around  them  (Breviglieri & Stavo-Debauge  1999).
Moreover, such a fine-grained approach reconciles a grammatical focus on the acceptable
structures of action and discourse, which can be mapped out and modeled in a systematic
way,  with  a  phenomenological  focus on  experience.  From  this  perspective,  indeed,
experience appears as a kind of two-sided entity. One of its sides is objective: it refers to
the typical tests that pertain to such or such order of worth (e.g. art, industry, family) and
that anyone has to experience and pass to be recognized as a normal, competent actor
(e.g. creating an original work of art, being a good father, making a profit, and so on).
Although typical, and “grammatically” expected in the different kinds of situations that
people  are  deemed  to  encounter,  such  tests  remain  nevertheless  pervious  to  the
particularity of the course of action in which they occur and sensitive to the singularity of
the persons that they are supposed to assess. The other side of experience is subjective: it
refers to the plural ways people feel, experience, appraise, suffer, in short engage in, and
are affected by, a given situation. Those “existential tests,” as Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 107)
puts it, refer to what provokes suffering and to what affects, such as the experience of
injustice or humiliation brought about by the contempt of those in position of power or
the experience of  emancipation created by rule transgression.  In other words,  on its
objective side, experience is related to the fact of experimenting, of testing – and being
tested by – a grammatical configuration, whereas, on its subjective side, experience is
related to the phenomenological fact of experiencing “what it is like” to be in such or such
grammatical configuration. 
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12 This pragmatic framework has also interesting consequences for social sciences from an
epistemological and political point of view. It means indeed that social sciences have to
relinquish  the  external  point  of  view  of  the  critical  sociologist,  whose  “revisionary
metaphysics” tries to correct the ordinary world-view that would supposedly mislead
agents, mainly by hiding the overall structure of domination that would remain, as such,
out of their reach (Bourdieu). Instead of establishing a strong asymmetry between social
scientists  and  those  taking  action,  pragmatic  sociology  adopts  a  “descriptive
metaphysics” that takes seriously the point of view “from within” of agents and follows
the possibilities of critique they actualize in the disputing activity that arises when a joint
action goes wrong.11
13 Although very heuristic, this perspective raises two important issues. First,  pragmatic
sociology focuses on the critical moments, from domestic quarrels to long-term judicial
litigations, in which agents call into question the implicit order of worth they were used
to uphold (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999). In so doing, this approach tends to overemphasize
the situations of dispute and justification in which participants transform a disagreement
into  a  reflexive  object  of  public  inquiry  and  become  thereby  a  “community  of
investigators,”  as  Dewey  would  put  it.  Boltanski  recently  made  more  explicit  the
similarities of such an approach with pragmatism: “We can therefore more or less link to
the spirit of pragmatism the way in which the sociology of critique undertook to describe
the social world as the scene of  a trial,  in the course of which actors in a situation of
uncertainty proceed to investigations, record their interpretations of what happens in reports,
establish qualifications and submit to tests” (2011 [2009]: 25). From this kind of “juridical”
view of the social, agents and, by way of consequence, the sociologist who study them, are
thus very busy producing the discursive, argumentative accounts that will re-establish a
justified, legitimate agreement and will keep, then, violence away. And yet, grammatical
constraints are not exclusive to modes of justification; they are also inherent to other
forms of reciprocal actions, including those in which a kind of rule-governed, “legal”
violence is “encapsulated.”
14 The second issue raised by pragmatic sociology is its endogenous “challenge” and the
underlying internal realism behind it: despite its attention to the internal resources for
critique,  such  challenge  might  nevertheless  render  social  critique  difficult  to  sustain.
Indeed pragmatic investigations avoid resorting to “beings” and values,  such as class
membership,  social  forces  or  symbolic  violence,  that  the  actors  themselves  do  not
explicitly bring into play. The problem is that, at least in certain situations that we will
discuss later on,  social  scientists have to leave aside the insider point of view of the
participant to adopt an external, reflective point of view that highlights and normatively
assesses the grammatical structures of interaction in which agents are entangled without
even knowing it.
15 It  is  precisely  this  issue  that  the  recent  book  of  Boltanski  (2011  [2009])  addresses
forcefully. Surprisingly enough, at least for scholars familiar with his previous works,
Boltanski proposes a “pragmatic sociology of critique” that supports a dual approach of the
social world: “pragmatic sociology” of critique focuses on “society,” that is, the “regimes of
action”  and  the  power  relations,  diverse,  partial,  local  or  transitory,  that  are  in  an
immediate relationship with the preoccupations of actors and their insider point of view.
By contrast, pragmatic “sociology of critique” focuses on the “social order,” that is,  the
world apprehended from the external point of view of the critical sociologist, who must
shed light on the overall, monolithic structure of domination that underlies the so-called
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“society” and remains invisible to the agent’s eyes. If we follow Boltanski, assuming an
external standpoint that breaks with the “objectivity-for-us” of the world seen “from
within” is imperative: only such standpoint can go beyond plural and superficial forms of
power,  which are readily observable,  to unmask the profound, enduring asymmetries
which, while assuming different forms in different contexts, are constantly duplicated to
the point  of  colonizing reality  as a whole.  So whereas  critique refers  to the socially
rooted, contextual forms of criticism to which ordinary agents and standard sociologists
have access to, “metacritique” refers to the theoretical constructions that aim to unmask,
in their most general, systematic dimensions, oppression, exploitation or domination – a
domination which occurs in the semantic determination of “what there is” and in the
normative qualifications and categorizations of beings.
16 As interesting as it might be, Boltanski’s framework and lexicon has a fatal weakness; it is
strikingly  dualist.  Indeed,  On  Critique depicts  a  “double  bottom”  society:  beyond  the
surface power relationships and insubstantial collectives that constitute the so-called
“society,” there is the “social order” of domination, sort of big semantic Leviathan which
structures  and  maintains,  via a  “top-down,”  continuous  process  of  totalization,  the
established order of beings.12 Unfortunately, such conceptual dualism between society
and social order and thereby between pragmatics and semantics tends to bypass plural
grammars of actions and self-qualifications of agents to better shed light on the deep,
one-dimensional, transversal meta-grammar that pits dominant elite against dominated
people.  The  “Précis of  critique”  that  Boltanski  proposes  is  thus  as  anti-pluralistic  as
politically  radical:  a  true emancipation can be only reached through a  revolutionary
movement,  necessary  for  rendering  “the  reality  of  the  reality”  in  which  agents  are
immersed unacceptable (Boltanski 2008). Revolution is indeed necessary to overthrow the
overarching semantic institutions, including the Law and the Welfare State, that make
the dominated unworthy and allows always the same privileged ones to win (Boltanski
2011 [2009]). 
17 In some respects, Boltanskian dualism is surprisingly similar, though more political, to
the one advocated by one of the founders of French sociology, Émile Durkheim himself, in
his critique of pragmatism. Indeed, in his Sorbonne lectures, given from 1913 to 1914,
Durkheim severely  criticizes  pragmatism:  “I  can accept  neither  the statement  of  the
idealists,  that in the beginning there is  thought,  nor that of the pragmatists,  that in the
beginning there is  action” (1983 [1955]:  67).  For the so-called “father of sociology,” the
problem with pragmatism lies in the fact that it conceives truth and reality as a matter of
individual experience and fails thereby “to recognize the duality that exists between the
mentality  which  results  from  individual  experiences  and  that  which  results  from
collective  experiences.”  Instead,  Durkheim  advocates  a  dual  perspective  that
distinguishes  high-level,  collective  representations  from  low-level,  individual
representations, and posits that “what is social [including truth, morality, and reason]
possesses  a  higher  dignity  than  what  is  individual”  (1983  [1955]:  68).  According  to
Durkheim,  such  founding  dualism  has  two  important  consequences.  From  an
epistemological point of view, it  allows the constitution of two autonomous scientific
disciplines: whereas individual representations and instincts are the object of psychology,
if  not  biology,  the “laws of  collective ideation” are the object  of  sociology.  From an
ontological point of view, society is not only a constraining whole which is more than the
sum of its individual parts; society is also an ennobling factor which adds a necessary and
universal dimension to the individual basic, primitive ways of thinking and acting. Since,
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within Durkheimian dualism, truth, morality, and reason are exclusively social emergent
properties,  they  can  be  grasped  only  if  individual-dependent  thoughts  and
representations are left aside. For Durkheim, the break with individual perceptions is thus
a double requirement that pragmatism does not satisfy (Durkheim 1982 [1895]).
18 As  seen  above,  such  break  with  individual  perceptions  is  also  at  the  heart  of  the
metacritical or metapragmatical project of Boltanski. While building on the project of
carrying out a sociology that does not give up on critique, this paper does not take up
such dual view of the social. We will propose another pathway to social critique by taking
more  seriously  the  pragmatic  assumption  according  to  which  the  action and  its
consequences – and neither the agent nor the historical, social, or economical context –
must be the unit of inquiry. We will argue that it would be preferable, for sociologists, to
give up on an overhanging standpoint and to focus on the rules, both constraining and
enabling,  that  constitute  and  structure  the  plural,  multi-layered,  and  collective
architecture of human actions. By unfolding the plural grammars that ordinary agents
navigate and enact  in the course of  their  daily  life,  sociological  inquiry can foster  a
reflexive attitude that potentially increases their power of action. That is at least what we
are going to argue in the following pages.
 
Bewitched by Social Practices
19 To address the link between grammar, phenomenology and social critique, we are going
to get back to the pioneering works of two very important scholars, the anthropologist
Jeanne Favret-Saada and the historian Michel de Certeau,  who have initiated in many
respects the grammatical investigation that pragmatic sociology advocates. Each in their
own way, their outstanding research on witchcraft and possession, published in the 1970’s,
underlines the “dark side” of grammatical constraints that force agents into a logic of
interaction which might be fatal.  Their approaches have several features in common.
Both  struggle  against  the  classical  anthropology  and  history  “from  above,”  which
postulates  the  asymmetrical  hold  of  the  official  authorities  and  talkative  elite  over
ordinary  people  –  an  asymmetry  that  the  condescending  stance  of  social  scientists
towards  “informants,”  wrongfully  transformed  into  the  passive  objects  of  their
intellectual  discourse,  happened  to  step  up.  Both  approaches  thus  introduced  a
symmetrical epistemology, systematized and extended later on by Bruno Latour, which
acknowledges all “have-nots” as deserving a place in history and anthropology. Finally,
Favret-Saada as well as Certeau favor a phenomenological standpoint that tries to do
justice  to  the  “thickness”  of  bodily  experiences,  emotions,  and practical  intelligence
enabling anyone, including the uneducated persons, to make sense of the world around
them. In so doing, both show that ordinary people do not blindly take up the public
“institutions of belief”;13 they do not necessarily believe in what their culture induces
them to say. So if public utterances and institutional rituals definitely delimit the official
domain of the “believable,” they do not necessarily reveal the scope and intensity of the
actual “believing.” To account for the beliefs that actually affect people, even when these
beliefs  look  as  unbelievable  as  witchcraft,  the  ethnographer  or  the  historian  must
imperatively give up on the objectifying gap that distances the all-knowing “discourse on
the other” from the mute, supposedly ignorant body that bears it.14
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20 But to be in a position to better compare the implications of the research of de Certeau
and Favret-Saada, we need to lay out the main features of the grammatical logics at work
in witchcraft and possession that they have so brilliantly described. 
 
II. Immersed in the Bocage
21 According to Favret-Saada (2009), the language of witchcraft is recruited to make sense of
the extraordinary repetition of unexpected and inexplicable misfortunes that overburden
a  landowner  and  his  possessions,  whether  they  be  human  (wife,  children),  animal
(livestock) or material (goods, production rate) (e.g., bankruptcy, child’s disease, wife’s
miscarriage, heifer’s death, engine’s failure, etc.). Faced with all these misfortunes, the
victim feels powerless, all the more as the official authorities, incarnated by the priest
and the doctor, are of no help to him:15 whereas the unruffled doctor resorts to natural
causes  and  bad  coincidences  for  explaining  his  misfortunes,  the  priest  just  invokes
faraway, immaterial beings on which he has no hold (Favret-Saada 1977). Above all, for
the victim,  neither the doctor nor the priest  are able to explain why those puzzling
events happen to him in particular.
22 Why  this  repetition  and  above  all,  why  “me”  and  why “now,”  wonders  the  person
stricken by misfortune. But even if the victim starts suspecting that his ordeals could
have  an  unnatural  cause,  he  cannot  initiate  by  himself  an  inquiry  into  his  possible
bewitchment without being taken for a half-wit. Such an inquiry must be initiated by an
‘annunciator,’ either a friend or a neighbor, who, by dint of witnessing this unlikely series
of misfortunes, asks the victim: “Should there not be, by chance, someone who wishes you ill?”
This question has incontestably an incredible performative power, that is, it performs an
action in saying what is said: it indeed modifies the status of its addressee, converting
him from an unlucky person into a possible “bewitched” and converting his misfortunes
into spell effects. This question, which also sounds as a diagnosis of mental sanity – you
are not a lunatic or a misfit but a bewitched – gives rise to a quest, which will lead the
victim and his wife to search for an “unwitcher.” Even though there are no symbolic
guarantees that the unwitcher will be able to cancel the spell, the mere fact of attributing
those misfortunes to an intentional cause, namely that of the “witch,” is the first step in a
long process of recovery.  With the help of the unwitcher,  indeed,  the bewitched will
hopefully retrieve his life energy by fighting back against the enemy who allegedly wants
his destruction.
23 In contrast to other studies on witchcraft,  which mostly emphasize the details of the
rituals, the exact wording of the phrases or the kinds of objects that are used to sustain it,
Favret-Saada’s ethnography insists on the relational and actional aspect of witchcraft. To
understand how really witchcraft works, it is not possible to draw upon the second-hand
knowledge  that  anthropologists,  psychiatrists,  folklorists,  journalists  and  official
authorities  produce  contemptuously  about  it.  As  Favret-Saada  forcefully  shows,  only
first-hand knowledge or  rather  first-hand “grasp” allows to see,  from “within,”  that
witchcraft  is  a  war  –  a  war  of  “deadly  words”  and  daily  struggles  but,  more
fundamentally, a war of forces in which the bewitched, the unwitcher and the witch are
caught in, whether they like it or not. But if witchcraft is a warfare, it is a very well
organized, rule-governed one that strongly constrains those who are involved in it. In
fact,  witchcraft  necessarily  involves  an  actancial  system,  composed  of  four
interdependent places: the ‘annunciator,’ the ‘bewitched,’ the ‘unwitcher’ and the ‘witch.’
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The ethnographer intensely experienced herself  that it  is  not  possible to escape this
system of places and the expectations tied to it: uttering a single word on witchcraft is
already getting involved in a power relationship in which one’s interlocutor is trying to
determine  one’s  proper  place,  to  evaluate  one’s  force  or  weakness,  to  assess  one’s
benevolence or malevolence, and so on. 
24 In our own words, this grammar-like system of witchcraft is governed by constitutive
rules that define the scope of what can be uttered and done by whom at which moment.
Only  the  annunciator  can  “interpellate”  the  victim and turn  him into  a  bewitched;
accordingly, it is not possible to enter into witchcraft as a bewitched simply upon one’s
own will: it is a place ascribed by others. But once caught in the place that others have
chosen for “me,” there is no way out – besides leaving the area. Of course, the most
striking hetero-ascription that forces some to get involved in witchcraft is that of which
the unfortunate alleged sorcerer is subjected to. Indeed, the witch is not in a position
from which it is possible to speak in the first person: he is reduced to a “third person,”
that is, a “non-person” that those who are part of the witchcraft crisis “speak about” but
“never speak to” (Benveniste 1966): he is spoken without being able to speak by himself.
There is no need of confession from the witch: he is not an audible voice but a function in
the system (Favret-Saada 1980 [1977]: 24). As for the unwitcher, it is a powerful but also
difficult place to take up, because only someone who is “strong enough” and ready to
“take it  all”  on oneself  can endorse it.  What  makes an unwitcher,  hence,  is  not  her
knowledge but her force16 – an enabling, “good,” “positive” force that she is nevertheless
ready to use for rendering evil for evil in her fight against the witch.
25 More generally, this preexisting system of places is polarized between those who possess
“the force” (the witch, the unwitcher) and those who are deprived of it (the bewitched)
(Favret-Saada 2011). Insofar as this force can be at work in the slightest utterance uttered
by one of the warring factions, decoding the meaning of what is said is far less important
than understanding who is  speaking to whom.  Just  as  the whole person of  the witch
embodies a negative force that turns his most trivial gestures into deadly attacks, it is the
entire being of the unwitcher that enters into action by way of the words that she utters
during the cure. In short, the contents of the words themselves count less than the very
fact  of  enunciation and  designation  that  allows  the  third-party  intervention  of  the
unwitcher to deviate the witch’s spells from his victim and to draw them towards an
opponent worthy of himself. 
 
Performing a New Social Contract?
26 Favret-Saada’s research on witchcraft is fundamentally pragmatic, in the two senses we
have unfolded above. First, it is pragmatic in the sense that it reveals the performative
force of the language in action, which manifests itself in the inaugural act of instantiating
the rule-governed system of witchcraft that the annunciator’s suggestion accomplishes
(e.g., “Is there someone who wishes you ill?”). This inaugural act, which is a first step towards
the normalization of the misfortune, starts the progressive restructuration and control of
the  unlimited,  malevolent  performative  force  of  the  sorcerer.  In  other  words,  two
conflicting  performative  forces,  of  different  kinds,  are  present  in  witchcraft.  The
performative force of the evil encapsulated into the deadly communicative acts of the
witch  is  totally  unbridled,  immediate  and  unexpected,  bursting  from  nowhere  and
The Social Scientist, the Public, and the Pragmatist Gaze
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
10
without any reason. Put in our own words, such brute performative force constitutes a
massive process of desinstitutionalization.
27 Indeed, Favret-Saada marvelously shows in her recent book, Désorceler (more explanatory
and social-centered than Deadly Words), that the alleged witch is a kind of free rider, who
gets  rich at  the expense of  others,  monopolizes  the goods  of  the  others,  and shows
himself impervious to social and moral rules (Favret-Saada 2009, 2011). The witch shakes
the common world that the bewitched shares with his fellow creatures and jeopardizes
the social equilibrium by refusing the minimal symmetry of conditions necessary to hold
society together (Favret-Saada 2011). The witch also jeopardizes social relationships at
large since the very possibility of his existence creates a climate of mutual suspicion and
mistrust: insofar as he is endowed with the power to cast a spell on anyone he wants to
despoil or destroy, anything can happen at any time, anyone who speaks to you can prove
fatal for you.
28 From this perspective, witchcraft can be seen as the symbolic reinstitutionalization of the
basics of the social contract, unduly jeopardized by the naked force of the witch but also
by the vulnerability and weakness of the bewitched (Favret-Saada 2011). The unwitcher
breaks off the direct and unequal confrontation between the culprit and his victim by
imposing  herself  as  the  inescapable  figure  of  the  Third:  her  force  is  regulated  and
mediated, allowing the resocialization of the negative, unregulated power of the witch by
forcing it into a rule-governed system of preestablished places. Because the unnamable is
absolute and asocial, one of the most important acts of micro-institutionalization that
witchcraft performs is naming.  Indeed, the apparently boundless force possessed by a
witch is a sort of black hole whose existence can be only inferred from its destructive
effects. “Naming the witch is an attempt to enclose within a figure something which, in
itself, escapes from figuration” (Favret-Saada 1980 [1977]: 74). The act of naming someone
from the circle of acquaintances, carefully prepared during the unwitchment sessions,
forces the witch into a system of names that turns him into a singular,  recognizable
individual, accountable, as such, for the harm he has done. 
29 So witchcraft progressively restores the social equilibrium by working as a system of
communicating vessels that draws the force from the witch and awakes the force, if not
the  violence,  of  the  victim.  Indeed,  the  vulnerability  of  the  bewitcher  is  due  to  his
difficulty to take on the legal, institutional violence that his social function of landowner
involves,  from  the  dispossession  of  siblings  to  the  exploitation  of  his  wife  to  the
competition with neighbors. Witchcraft therapy is a pedagogical undertaking that awakes
his aptitude for violence while keeping the appearance of a right, justified and necessary
fight between the principles of the Good against those of the Evil (Favret-Saada 2009).
Thus what the unwitcher Mrs. Flora brings into play in her therapy sessions is not only
the  salvation of  the  singular  person of  the  bewitched;  it  is  more  fundamentally  the
“ethical order of the world”: the bewitched is entrusted with the upholding of social and
moral principles that transcend his singularity. 
30 If witchcraft is pragmatic in the sense of the performative force of enunciation, which has
the  power  to  do  what  it  says,  it  is  also  pragmatic  in  a  second  sense:  the  partial
indeterminacy  of  the  course  of  action  and  the  phenomenological  intensity  of  the
experience of  those who are “caught in.” Actually,  as will  be seen below, individuals
portrayed by Favret-Saada are not re-enacting some learned scripts or actions; they are
affected by the way things appear to them in an unpredictable or uncontrollable fashion. 
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Believe It or Not: From Grammar to Phenomenology
31 Favret-Saada  (2009)  describes  the  grammar-like  system of  witchcraft  basically  as  an
essential  therapeutic device  operating  at  the  margins  of  public  knowledge  and
institutional beliefs. By granting the victim a central place in an actancial system where
what happens to him seems to make sense, and proposing him an intelligible narrative,
witchcraft restores the unfortunate to subjecthood. To use our own words, witchcraft is a
dialogic process of empowerment that opens up, for the victim, a hopeful, enabling but
also constraining, field of action. He is no longer the patient of a series of untoward
happenings but an actor who can and must fight back the obscure, evil forces of the
alleged witch (Favret-Saada 2009). According to the anthropologist, the series of action
that the unwitcher Mrs. Flora prescribes the bewitched to accomplish are like so many
steps in a ritual whose real efficiency lies in its capacity of forcing the patient to leave his
position of passive victim.
32 Interestingly,  this process of resubjectivation does not require from the bewitched to 
believe in witchcraft, which remains rationally unbelievable for everyone, including those
who are  caught  in  it  against  their  own will.  Rather such process  requires  from the
bewitched to suspend disbelief and, above all, to be ready to do anything that could bring
his ills to an end. This requirement is not epistemic but pragmatic: what matters is to do
something. As philosophical pragmatists have pointed out, belief, unlike knowledge, is
fundamentally a propensity and a power to act. When one has “the death at one’s heels,”
Favret-Saada says, one cannot afford to launch an epistemic inquiry, to make a cultural
fuss or to search for symbolic guarantees: only the result counts, in this case the end of
hardship (Favret-Saada 2011). From this perspective, belief in witchcraft, if any, is not a
stable state of mind that one possesses and entertains in one’s inner world. On the one
hand, indeed, people,  including uneducated peasants,  have the cognitive flexibility to
believe and not to believe at the same time, to navigate a mobile and ambivalent world of
shifting  realities,  in  short  to  envisage,  for  the  temporary  sake  of  the  situation,  that
bewitchment  is  not  an  impossible  hypothesis.  On  the  other  hand,  belief  is  not  a
proposition in the head: instead it is a way of being concerned with, or affected by, which
remains vague enough to pass reality tests but involving enough to restore life energy.17
So as Favret-Saada powerfully suggests it, if the conducts adopted within the witchcraft
world might possibly be “without beliefs,” they are incontestably with affects.18
33 Drawing  from  the  work  of  Favret-Saada,  one  can  surmise  that  what  one  could  call
“pragmatic beliefs,” if  one can still  speak of belief – which is far from obvious for this
author –  do not  involve any epistemic stance:  practical  commitment suffices  to lead
temporarily the “affected” to leave behind the ordinary way of life to enter a world in
which the insufferable can be turned into a series of words and actions. Inside this world
of actions, present and future, the strange beings which are part of the witchcraft arsenal
tend to be endorsed with an “objectivity-for-us” that escapes from scrutiny and ordinary
reality tests. Importantly, the “objectivity-for-us” of witchcraft is neither the object of a
“referential contract” that would place it in the empirical order of things that really exist,
nor the object of a “fictional contract” that would defuse its empirical implications by
specifying “it is only a story.” The “objectivity-for-us” of witchcraft is rather the object of
a  “deferential  contract”  that  allows  participants  to  “validate  on  credit”  the  strange
creatures, such as witches, bewitched, evil, etc., which do not satisfy the usual demands of
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reference – validation that they accomplish by referring not to a state of affairs but to the
belief of others (Kaufmann 2006). Of course, in the world of witchcraft that Favret-Saada
describes, the actual “others” who guarantee the holding of pragmatic beliefs are more
than scarce since they are mainly the annunciator and, in a second step, the unwitcher.
But as Michel de Certeau (1981) points out in his comments on Favret-Saada’s research,
the peasants of the Bocage do back the “indefinite plural” of those others who might
believe in witchcraft:  “there are people who believe in it,”  the interviewees say,  the
alleged belief of indeterminate others vouching for the conceivable, if not the believable,
in spite of its lack of institutional support and public maintenance. 
34 If witchcraft in the France of the 1970’s is deprived of institutional support and public
maintenance,  this is  obviously not the case in the France of the 1630’s:  the series of
demonic possession that Michel de Certeau dwells on is characterized by the support of
the centralized religious authority, at least at the beginning of the “case,” as well as by its
public reach. As will be seen, comparing a crisis which lies under the seal of secrecy and a
crisis which gives rise to a public dramaturgy raises differently the issue of the inquiry,
social and scientific, that cultural practices can trigger. So after addressing Favret-Saada’s
remarkable  fieldwork  on  witchcraft  among  Normand  farmers,  let  us  consider
Michel de Certeau’s magnificent study, written a few years before Deadly Words, about a
crisis of possessions that took place, in the south of France, during a century plagued with
wars of religion.
 
III. When Evil Becomes Public: The Torments of
Possession
35 The Possession at Loudun (2000 [1970]) narrates in a subtle way the contest that occurs
between exorcists, physicians, and the king’s representatives as they try to characterize
and put an end to the demonic deeds that bedevil an Ursuline convent from 1632 to 1638.
In  a  chapter  published  subsequently,  “Language  altered:  the  sorcerer’s  speech,”  the
author  briefly  recapitulates  the  perspective  he  adopted in  his  historical  monograph:
“Loudun is successively a metonymy and a metaphor allowing us to apprehend how a
state policy [une “raison d’État”], a new rationality, replaces a religious reason” (Certeau
1988b [1975]: 246). 
36 To account for this historical shift in the relation between the sacred and the profane,
religion and science,  Certeau  adopts  two distinct  but  correlated  and complementary
perspectives. The first perspective tries to apprehend the diabolical spectacle as a social 
phenomenon.  Indeed, the historian proceeds through a close examination of the social
positions located  in  the  prevailing  fields  –  mainly  the  religious,  the  medical  and the
political ones – which work, sometimes agonistically, within the Loudun society during
the  possession  crisis.  Such  careful  examination  allows  Certeau  to  infer,  from  the
alterations  happening  in  the  different  logics  at  work,  the  shifts  in  the  collective
imagination of the time. The second perspective focuses on the discourse spoken by the
possessed women – or, perhaps better, the discourse being spoken through them – with
two  complementary  lenses,  one  grammatical,  and  the  other  phenomenological.  The
grammatical investigation aims at uncovering the actancial systems and the places of
enunciation  that  constitute  social  activities  such  as  exorcism.  As  for  the
phenomenological investigation, it digs up the experience of the possessed, deeply buried
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in, even under, the archives that document it. Reaching deeper into the pre-discursive
strata of the subject’s experience, the analysis tries to account for an experience that
shakes the system of social positions by playing with the assigned places of enunciation.
In  Certeau’s  conceptuality,  indeed,  the  subversion  of  discursive  reason,  whether
theological,  medical,  or legal,  takes place as the nuns’  enunciation [énonciation]  plays
with, and within, the interstices inherent to any social system of statements [énoncés].
37 Our discussion of Certeau’s study will follow those two moments of analysis: the first
moment focuses on the way the social fields advance diverging claims to adjudicate the
crises  of  possessions  whereas  the  second  moment  focuses  on  the  grammatical  and
phenomenological aspects of those same possessions.
 
The Theater of the Possessed as a Social Phenomenon
38 According  to  Certeau,  possession  cases  and  witchcraft  trials  are  both  diabolical
manifestations occurring contemporaneously in post-Reformation Europe, but differ in
some  important  regards.  Though  waves  of  witchcraft  trials  spread  across  northern
countries between 1570 and 1685, they remain relatively rare in the South.19 On the other
hand, possessions are a southern phenomenon that stretches from 1559 to 1663, their
typical form being the well-documented Gaufridy trial that took place in Aix-en-Provence
(1609-11)  and  provided  the  plot  for  the  events  of  Loudun.  Furthermore,  witchcraft
happens  in  rural  settings  and has  a  distinctive  binary structure  that  pits  a  sorcerer
against urban judges. In that context, witchery discourse works as a way to frame and
conceal a fight among protagonists of asymmetric social statuses and thus secret trials
functions as  an  effective  procedure  for  lettered  elites  to  contain  and  crush  popular
unrest.20 Conversely, possession cases share a ternary structure, with the public attention
focusing on the victim (the possessed), and not on the judge or the sorcerer. Contrary to
witchcraft trials, those cases lead to an overt confrontation where central participants
share a similar social status and urban setting.
39 Since  the  Reformation  and  until  1632,  Loudun has  been a  Protestant  vanguard  in  a
predominantly Catholic territory. The arrival in town of diverse Catholic religious orders
protected by the king (Jesuits, Discalced Carmelites, etc.), since 1606, and the creation of
convents indicate that the Counter-Reformation is on its way. Possessions have played a
great part in this process, for the Catholic confrontation with the devils is a very effective
way of confirming, in a supernatural manner, which of the contending persuasions is the
true Christian faith. Yet, religious divisions are losing their power to define the line of
confrontation between the parties. More and more, the dividing line will  pass among
defenders of, and opponents to, local privileges, threatened by the royal prerogatives of
the centralized authority. Religious truth is losing ground, as reason [raison] and right are
becoming an attribute of the State.
40 The Loudun possessions start by the end of September 1632 within a context fraught with
tension, as a plague episode that wiped out 3,700 of the 14,000 inhabitants is about to end
—a tragic reminder of the epidemic which already afflicted the city in 1603. Interestingly,
demonic afflictions are said to propagate just as  the Black Death is  thought  then to
disseminate,  that is,  by way of smell.  Thus,  the nuns present to their exorcists three
thorns  from a  hawthorn  and  a  bouquet  of  musk  roses  as  a  proof  of  the  sorcerer’s
enchanted misdeeds. The enchantment supposedly works through a scent that captured
and obsessed the Ursulines in a supernatural manner. The enchanter – a sophisticated
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and handsome priest by the name of Urbain Grandier – is gradually designated, during
the exorcisms, by the demons speaking through the possessed.21
41 At Loudun, possessions are an utterly serious matter, for they will determine which reason
– religious, scientific or political – will prevail against the devils that take hold and agitate
the nuns. And in this confrontation, publicity plays a crucial role. As long as the demonic
deeds remain enclosed within the convent, in the prioress’ room, the exorcists’ religious
language provides an indisputable description of what is happening. But as soon as the
phenomenon enters the public place, it becomes a spectacle that everybody duly attends
according to his or her rank. The whole society, starting with aristocracy and bourgeoisie,
come to see and to be seen, in an increasing publicity that has a corroding effect on the
credibility of the exorcism, turning the combat with the demons into a disputable matter.
42 As possession cases go on, “His Majesty’s” superintendent is sent to settle the possession
affair by lending the clergy a hand in order to secure the sturdiness of the social order. Of
course, this order is sustained by a certain kind of public credibility, always entangled with
credulities, which draws the boundaries of what is considered credible, trustworthy, and
shareable in the whole society.22 As the old organization of certainties breaks apart, social
critique  steps  into  the  breach.  The  king’s  intendant tries  to  keep up appearances  by
ordering the magistrates sitting in court to regularly attend mass, so that they can adore
the Holy Sacrament and listen to the exorcists’ homilies. Even so, rumours continue to
spread. To silence the skeptical voices and put an end to the doubts taking over the
population, the superintendent forbids, with a banning proclaimed and displayed on the
streets, any malicious gossip against the afflicted nuns or their exorcists. But the placards
will not last for long: their tearing up illustrates the kind of adherence they will meet
among the public. 
43 Admittedly,  the  libertine  priest  accused  of  sorcery,  Urbain  Grandier,  will  be  tried,
tortured and burned at the stake, and the royal order of things, apparently still based
upon religious  foundations,  restated.  Still,  the  public,  pluralistic  turmoil  that  shakes
Loudun bears witness to the decreasing legitimacy and credibility of an order on the
point of vanishing: that of a religion that used to unify the experience of being in the
world and provided a homogenous worldview to a unified political community. In spite of
appearances, the Loudun crisis has thus resulted in a new distribution of powers and
prerogatives: politics will grant its unity to a society more and more pluralistic; science
will  administer  a  natural truth;  and  religion  will  be  left  with  the  “spiritual,”  the
supernatural,  that area,  in a secular world,  which stretches on the margins of  human
affairs (Certeau 1987 [1969]).
44 Loudun is a theatre where the possessed bodies are publicly exposed and where a public
competition, discursive and practical, takes place for getting them back in the grip of
normality. On the Theater of the Possessed, divergent claims to administer the truth and
to provide a foundation for the common ground on which society stands are made visible,
discussed and contested. The confrontations about the naming, by men of power, of what
is really happening to those possessed women, reflect what is happening at the level of
collective  representations:  the  troubles  that  bodily  affect  the  nuns  somatize  the
disturbances  that  run through the whole  social  body.  Of  course,  the proliferation of
dissonant discourses from the main actors of this theatrical drama, mainly the Catholic
Church, the royal court, law courts, academies, medical schools, the Ursulines and the
Jesuites, mostly affects the different fields, mainly religious, medical, and political, that
they are supposed to represent and incarnate. Even if deviltries will be the transitional
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solutions to the erosion of  certainties,  the public  spectacle  of  the overt  dissent  that
divides the authorities acts in a transformative manner on the social structure. 
45 If the long-lasting crisis of possession in Loudun has definitely transformed the social
positions and the links of interdependence between the different fields that sustained the
ancient social order, it has also transformed the semiotic order that upheld it. If we follow
Certeau, the relevant locus to investigate the transformative character of discourse is not
only at the level of the social organization; it is also at the level of action and experience,
whether they be individual or collective, as will be shown in the following pages. 
 
Diabolical Enunciation: The Phenomenology Beneath the Grammars
of Possession
46 Certeau’s pragmatic and phenomenological  conceptions of  discourse,  especially in his
paper “The Sorcerer’s Speech” (1988b [1975]), merge into his characteristic enunciative
approach, which is influenced in particular by Lacanian psychoanalysis and Benveniste’s
linguistics of enunciation. In Certalian conceptuality,  discourse is a public action that
depends  and acts  in  a  transformative  manner  on the  social  structure.23 Importantly,
discourse  is  always  enunciated  from  a  place [ lieu],  which  in  turn  coordinates  two
dimensions closely related to one another, even though they obey in part their own logic:
the  first  dimension  is  social,  referring  to  a  location  in  society;  the  other  is  semiotic,
referring to  a  position in discourse,  that  is,  an enunciative  position.  Though Certeau’s
concepts are extremely efficient in grasping the intricate links that relate, impact and
transform both local interactions and social structures by way of discourse, they remain
relatively vague. While drawing inspiration from this author’s insights, we will use more
specific conceptual tools, mainly the concept of grammar, in order to approach the power
of discourse to establish and to transform enunciative positions and, more generally, the
social order.24 
47 Indeed, the concept of grammar allows to better specify the transformative power of
discourse over the social order. As it can be seen, the selection of the relevant grammar,
either religious,  medical,  or political,  supposed to define the crisis  of  possession,  has
serious consequences for the organization of the social order and, potentially, for society
as  a  whole.  In  particular,  the  competition  between  the  religious  and  the  medical
grammars, which try both to make sense of the experience of the possessed, is a major
social and political issue. For exorcism is one of the privileged grammars of the religious
field,  even if  it  starts to be called into question by some prominent priests,  whereas
medical diagnosis is the central grammar of the growing reason-oriented field of science.
Of course, the victory of one of these grammars over its rivals positively affects the social
positions of those who are particularly concerned with its enactment. Inversely, the lack
of currency – the loss of credibility25 – of a given grammar has downgrading effects on the
positions closely related to it, as shown by the erosion of the religious language during
the Loudun events and the closing supremacy of the political reason over its competitors.
But to understand the transforming impact, at the social level, of the selection of a given
grammar from among the available grammatical repertoire of the time, we need to dwell
more precisely on the normative and semiotic work of grammar.
48 If we extrapolate from Certeau’s analysis, the order of action and experience has, at least
in part, a grammatical status: it constitutes both a system of rule-governed participation and
a way of symbolization or, stated differently, a way to represent and make sense of what is
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happening in a given context and, further, in the social body. A grammar operates as an
actancial system, which defines a system of places (e.g. exorcist-possessed, doctor-patient,
and so on), opens up a field of action and delimits the enunciative positions that those
who are involved in it can endorse. For instance, medical diagnosis, which is particularly
threatening for the authority of the priests in charge of curing the possessed, entails two
complementary, structural places of enunciation, that is,  the doctor and the patient’s
body. By contrast, exorcism entails four places of enunciation, namely the exorcist, the
sorcerer, the victim, and the evil spirit. Thus, the exorcism that a priest performs on an
afflicted person leads to count this latter as a possessed, whereas the same person treated
by a doctor will count as a patient suffering from a disease. Of course, those different
systems of places render possible different kinds of activities. When the exorcist names
and addresses the evil spirit speaking through the possessed, he is awaiting from the
demon to confirm that the suggested name was a correct guess – confirmation that would
grant the priest a binding authority over the demonic entity. The words uttered by the
afflicted nun, as a possessed body, are central to the unfolding of the exorcism. On the
other hand, the nun’s speech, even demonized, is unnecessary, if not unwanted, during a
medical encounter with a 17th century physician: the symptoms affecting the patient’s
corporal surface (e.g., sweat, pulse, etc.) are readable as a proof not of the presence of a
supernatural entity but of a natural illness. 
49 We  arrive  then  at  the  heart  of  possession  and  are  able  now to  elucidate  how that
phenomenon  weaves  together  the  social,  grammatical,  but  also  phenomenological
dimensions. As mentioned briefly, a central aspect of exorcism has to do with naming:
“exorcism is essentially an enterprise of denomination intended to reclassify a protean
uncanniness within an established language” (Certeau 1988b [1975]:  255-6).  The nun’s
identity is altered by a subterranean affliction that needs to be expressed in a shared
language to find its etiology and cure. This process of symbolizing, deeply inspired by
Certeau’s psychoanalytical conceptuality, is a way of stating what is evil and reinstating
the afflicted person within an official grammar and, more generally, within the social
order – a social  order that is  thereby reestablished:  “naming simultaneously posits a
linkage and a place.  It  functions at  once as  participation in  a  system and access  to  the
symbolic” (Certeau 1988b [1975]: 262). Interestingly, both exorcists and physicians, in spite
of the competing, exclusive explanations that they advocate, rely on the same naming
procedure to tame the (d)evil that lurks within the afflicted woman. As Certeau puts it,
doctors and exorcists agree enough to “eliminate an extra-territoriality of language” and
to  ascribe  the  possessed  nuns  to  a  determinate  place,  simultaneously  a  place  of
enunciation and a position within a social order. “What they are fighting through acts of
naming is a text-off, a writing of otherness, where the possessed woman is located when
she presents herself as the statement of something that is fundamentally other” (Certeau
1988b [1975]: 247).
50 This “verbal imperialism” leaves very few opportunities of resisting to the possessed, who
have locked themselves into the tautological,  “magical circle” of possession. Still,  the
hetero-ascription of an enunciative place does not tell in advance how an actual person
will feel,  experience, nor fulfill or experiment the social role she is subjected to. Here,
then, grammar intersects with phenomenology, that is, with concrete experience. Such
intersection leads Certeau to make two claims.26 The first claim is that there is a gap
between  the  lettered,  systematic  discourses  on  possession  and  the  unarticulated,
tentative  experience  of  the  possessed.  The  second  claim  is  even  more  radical:  the
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possessed cannot articulate a discourse before encountering the symbolic systems proper
to the grammars of exorcism or disease; there is just an altering disturbance. 
51 For Certeau, such inarticulate disturbance leads us to the cause of the trauma, which has
to do with the afflicted person’s incapacity to state, and account for, her own identity. A
rift is opened between the speaking subject and a definite proper name, a rift expressed
by the paradoxical utterance that Certeau quotes from Rimbaud, “Je est un autre,” or “I is
another”  (1988b  [1975]:  255).  As  the  possessed  speaks,  her  “I”  is  always  unstable,
changing.  Therefore  the  naming performed by  the  exorcist  (or  the  doctor)  “aims  at
restoring the postulate of all language, that is, a stable relation between the interlocutor,
‘I,’ and a social signifier, the proper name” (1988b [1975]: 256). Exorcism tries to solve this
enunciative  aberration by giving the  possessed woman a  proper  name taken from a
definite and cultural list of demons. Thus, as she recognizes the action of a particular
devil  within  her,  the  name standing  for  a  character  and a  set  of  specific  attributes
(Asmodeus, Leviathan, etc.), the nun reoccupies a place, though an intermediary one
before full recovery, within discourse and social organization. The process works then as
a kind of re-calibration of her social coordinates. The ascription of a stable proper name,
even  a  demonic  one,  permits  her  rehabilitation  among  society  by  ascribing  to  her
determined and reliable properties.
52 Though  powerful,  the  naming procedures  calling  the  possessed  to  order  can  still  be
twisted, at least momentarily. To take up Certeau’s latter terminology (2011 [1980]), even
if the strategic definition of the prevailing grammar does belong to the subjects of will and
power, in this case the authority representatives, seemingly powerless agents such as
nuns can use tactics to resist this definition. In fact, the possessed women can be said to
use two different tactics to escape from the strategies of symbolization and nomenclature
confinement that cultural authorities impose upon them. A first tactic is to refuse to
enter  the  grammar of  exorcism.  By becoming mute  or  begging to  be  left  alone,  the
possessed  nuns  display  a  glimpse  of  the  first-person  authority  that  is  supposed  to
disappear from the diabolical grammar of possession. In so doing, the nuns transgress the
constitutive rules of demonological experience and draw the investigators on uncertain
ground, forcing them to attend a more obedient possessed. A second tactic is to play with
the grammar of the exorcism, the Ursulines navigating through the predefined places
offered  to  them by  the  catalogue  of  demonic  proper  names.  Instead  of  occupying  a
definite place of enunciation, they would constantly wander from Astaroth to Balam to
Behemoth to Isacaron, and so on, in an infinite diabolical dance. Such a move, which
seems at  first  to  corroborate  the effectiveness  of  the  exorcism,  ends  perverting and
undermining  it  as  the  exorcist  keeps  repeating  the  same  naming  operation,  like  a
desperate  parent  tries  in  vain  to  impose  one’s  authority  on  a  mischievous  child  by
repeating incessantly the same ultimatum.
53 This  reveals  how  the  religious  grammar  was  unsettled  from  within.  The  refusal  to
cooperate that some nuns oppose to the public eye, whether medical, clerical or ordinary,
does  not  take  the  form  of  an  articulated  discourse.  Instead  it  takes  the  form  of  a
fragmentary,  stealthy  “art  of  opportunity”  that  momentarily  twists  the  force-
relationships that are imposed upon them. The fact that even the oppressed can find
refuge in the “makeshift creativity” proper to tactics shows that the structural, strategic
power of the grammatical places of enunciation is never wholly determining; it is always
negotiated and potentially resisted by the subjective, particular way in which agents hold,
and are affected by, the place of enunciation they are supposed to take up.27
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54 As the exorcist tries to capture the devil and prove the truth of the Catholic faith, the
nuns’ enunciative moves turn the horrific confrontation with the supernatural into an
edifying show staging the appearance of civilized demons and – as Certeau summarizes it
bluntly – where snacks are served to the spectators that come to fill the churches (2000
[1970]: 3).  The crumbling of  the religious empire upon consciences,  starting with the
possessed, necessitates an urgent action from another power, that of the State. “Since
enclosure within the religious onomastic checkerboard does not work, it will be replaced
by another grid, that of the police. Thus will end the story of Loudun. Laubardemont,
Richelieu’s clerk, will assign places to possessed women – no longer in onomastic squares,
but now in the confinement of  cells.  State policy now classifies  by means of  walls  –
another problem” (Certeau 1988b [1975]: 260).
55 Thus,  the  circle  comes  to  an  end.  Certeau’s  analysis  brilliantly  demonstrates  how
grammar and phenomenology, social order and the individuals experience are intricately
interwoven. The same affection that shakes the possessed unsettles the whole city. The
possession  at  Loudun  is  then  an  “existential  test”  [épreuve]  for  the  nuns  and  their
interlocutors, but also at test for the society as a whole, the principal orders of credibility
on which society rests being fully investigated. The nuns’ bodies become the locus where
the troubles of Loudun are somatized and exposed. Simultaneously, those same bodies are
the place where available grammars are explored and put to the test in order to re-form
the social body around other means of symbolization. 
 
IV. At the Heart of Public Critique
56 As we have tried to show, the works of Jeanne Favret-Saada and Michel de Certeau share
common features, even if they address empirical fields situated in very different epochs
and  cultures.  Both  approaches  focus  on  how,  at  a  social,  grammatical  and
phenomenological level, witchcraft and demonology enhance and constrict the scope of
possible actions that actors can appropriately undertake. After emphasizing the main
meeting points of those approaches, we will discuss on which aspects they diverge. Those
divergences, we will see, are mainly due to the different nature of their fieldworks, which
are situated in various spaces and times and raise differently the issue of the social and
scientific inquiry.
 
The “Grammatical Correction” of Unspeakable Troubles
57 Favret-Saada reconstitutes the actantial scheme of witchcraft by experiencing it in the
first person. Indeed, her brilliant ethnography was made possible because – and only
because – she was “caught up” in it herself. For solely those directly affected by actual
witchcraft situations can grasp the logic of being bewitched and unwitched. By dint of
investigating her own experience, the anthropologist succeeds eventually in unearthing
and reconstituting the grammar which shapes it in depth: the grammar of an actantial
system which unites both the bewitched and the unwitcher against a designated common
enemy, in this case the sorcerer. By definition, this system only allows two enunciative
positions, that of the bewitched and the unwitcher, thereby silencing the unfortunate
sorcerer whose point of view, we will get back to it, is made literally impossible to hear. 
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58 As it summons magical forces, witchcraft therapy provides a sense of coherence to the
disruptive events that have affected the bewitched, and endows him with the power to
overcome the evil tricks plotted by the sorcerer. But while treating the alleged victim at a
supernatural  level,  the  same  therapy  simultaneously  distorts  ordinary  social
relationships and usual communication between neighbors within the community – let us
recall, indeed, that the suspected sorcerer must be a landowner from the neighborhood.
At the social level, witchcraft thus appears as a survival fight where the capacity of the
bewitched to become a landowner is put to the test: he must become able to exert the
legal and social violence that is involved in the monopolizing of his familial inheritance
and thereby in the despoliation of the share of his siblings. Thus, Favret-Saada proceeds
in an ascending way: beginning from her phenomenological experience, she moves to the
grammar of  witchcraft  and finally  unveils  the  social  stake  that  the  inheritance  of  a
familial patrimony represents in the rural context of the Bocage.
59 Also  dwelling  on  the  interplay  between  social,  grammatical  and  phenomenological
dimensions, Certeau’s research covers an analytical spectrum similar to that of Favret-
Saada  but  starts  from the  opposite  pole.  Indeed,  his  analysis  begins  with  the  three
contending social fields, religion, science, and politics, that the possessions of Loudun
unsettle, leading to a redistribution of the influence that those fields exert in society. As
seen  above,  this  shift  is  triggered  by  the  grammars  invoked  to  make  sense  of  the
disruption  caused  by  the  possessions.  Thus,  the  religious  grammar  of  “exorcism”
configures the respective roles of the protagonists (‘exorcists,’ ‘possessed,’ etc.) and their
possible actions in a way different from that of the medical grammar of ‘disease.’ Whereas
the scientific grammar does not need an external help, its explanations being founded on
the natural order of things, the religious etiology will hold out only thanks to the political
raison d’État, which goes to its rescue in order to secure the (Catholic) religious ideology
that provides the divine law of  the French king with its  symbolical  foundations.  But
Certeau does  not  stop his  inquiry at  the grammatical  level;  he also reveals  how the
experience  of  the  nuns  operates  with and  within  the  actantial  system  of  exorcism,
undoing  it  from  the  inside  and  thereby  participating  to  the  deconstruction  of  the
homogenous  religious  order.  Importantly,  even  though  the  social,  grammatical  and
phenomenological  dimensions  keep  a  relative  autonomy,  they  are  none  the  less
interwoven, not only descriptively but also ontologically speaking: social structures and
individual experiences are closely interrelated by normative grammars of description and
action.28
60 Strikingly, both Favret-Saada and Certeau thematize the central role played by the act of
naming in  witchcraft,  exorcism  and  diagnosis.  Naming  contributes  to  defining  the
situation and ascribes definite roles to the participants. Here, the pragmatic dimension of
discourse is inseparable from its meaningful counterpart: a grammar provides concrete
possibilities for action but also a reason,  an order,  to what is happening. Extending a
psychoanalytical approach to social issues, both studies show how naming participates in
the symbolizing of a disruptive trouble. By resorting to the symbolic features of a shared
language, symbolization reintegrates the troublesome event or person within the bounds
of the community. In other words, symbolizing has a socializing effect: it reunites society
around a common etiology and attributes to each participant a role in the grammar
selected to make sense of the situation.
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Reviving Public Inquiry
61 Beyond their  striking convergence,  the works of  Favret-Saada and Certeau have also
important dissimilarities that deserve to be addressed. Those differences revolve around
the conceptions of publicity and the role of public inquiry, in their practical and normative
dimensions.  Indeed,  the  phenomena  studied  by  those  authors  have  a  different
relationship to publicity and publicisation and are differently open to third parties. 
62 Thus, witchcraft seems to be unspeakable for two reasons. First, it cannot be the object of
declarative discourse or propositional knowledge from those that are involved or have
been involved: within witchcraft, speech, beliefs, and experience have no “aboutness”;
not only are they pure acts, but also potentially deadly ones. Secondly, witchcraft must be
kept secret because it is publicly despised and held up to ridicule, by the medical, political
and clerical authorities as well as by the ordinary inhabitants of the Bocage themselves.
By contrast, the cases of possession that Certeau dwells on are characterized by their
public reach. For the troubles afflicting the nuns quickly give rise to a public inquiry
where  different  reasons,  mainly  religious,  scientific,  political,  are  tested.  Whereas
witchcraft  is  deprived  of  any  endogenous  publicity  and  condemned  to  secrecy,  the
exorcism is, right from the start, conceived as a public “spectacle” or “theatre,” to take
up Certeau’s words.
63 From an epistemological and normative perspective, comparing the way witchcraft and
possession deal with publicity is very informative. Since the events of Loudun have an
endogenous propensity towards publicity and publicisation, it suffices, for the analyst, to
unfold the public disputes and to follow the actors in their exchanges and critiques. So if
Certeau  can  adopt  a  descriptive  stance,  this  is  because  the  phenomenon  that  he
investigates,  which is  a  public,  pluralistic  inquiry  into  the  critical  transformation of
religious values and practices, is so to speak doing the “normative job” in his place.29 Even
if this public inquiry progressively turns into a collective, fatal dramaturgy, which leads
to sentencing to death the alleged sorcerer, the doubt about what or who to believe has
been cast, the religious criteria have been dislocated, and a more pluralistic and open
order has replaced the monistic “closed” one.
64 By contrast, the system of witchcraft described “from within” by Favret-Saada is neither
public, nor pluralistic: it is a private interlocution, an individual therapy performed in
camera to restore the strength of the bewitched, supposedly drawn away by the witch’s
spell. The problem, here, is that the ethnographer, as pragmatic as she may be, cannot
count on “folk” resources for critique, which are strikingly absent from her fieldwork. In
the Bocage, indeed, a public, critical inquiry into sorcery cannot possibly exist because
witchcraft is not an official resource or a public theory of misfortune that would allow
natives to attest to their status of competent members of community. On the contrary,
witchcraft needs secrecy to survive – a secrecy that the peasants have no interest in
disclosing given the symbolic benefits that witchcraft is likely to provide. In the Bocage,
witchcraft is sustained by the vicious circle of pragmatic beliefs which are incorrigible
because, as we saw, they are shielded from reality tests, but also because they escape from
the critical plurality of points of view, a plurality that is a constitutive feature of social and
scientific inquiry.30
65 Now, when the actors themselves do not perform critique and normative distanciation,
we can wonder whether the “endogenous challenge” of pragmatic approaches can be held
The Social Scientist, the Public, and the Pragmatist Gaze
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
21
to the end, even if it means leaving aside the tragic consequences of magical therapy for
the unfortunate witch. Indeed, the micro-politics of witchcraft, if it looks like a valuable
process of resubjectivation when it is seen from inside,  allowing the bewitched to shift
position from the status of patient to that of agent, looks very different when seen from
outside. Even without endorsing the condescending view of the official authorities or the
rational-like,  distant  stance  of  the  peasants  when  they  are  prompted  to  speak
theoretically  about  it,  witchcraft-from-the-outside appears  not  very commendable.  In
fact, it is a secret, non-public inquiry which responds to a kind of “schmittian logic,” in
the rather negative sense of Carl Schmitt: the recovery of the “bewitched” relies on the
old trick of the “enemy within.” The deadly opposition between “me” and “him” enables
the landowner and his family to act again as a collective body. In short, witchcraft is
governed by an exclusion principle and a process of boundary making whose price is very
high: the sacrifice of the scapegoated witch, who bears the brunt of the whole cure. 
66 Paradoxically, after powerfully criticizing the objectifying discourse stated by external
“authorities”  (State,  science,  church)  about  natives,  the  endogenous  ethnography  of
Favret-Saada cannot avoid taking up the violence exerted against the alleged witch whose
tragic experience of ostracism remains desperately unspoken of. “No need to listen to
him,” the bewitched, the unwitcher, if not the ethnographer, say, “his death speaks for
him.” Reduced to the status of a “third person,” the alleged witch is excluded from the
space of the interlocution, he is never an “I” or a “you,” including for the ethnographer. 
Now, as a lot of commentators inspired by Benveniste (1966) have emphasized, the moral
and political  significance of  a  system can be measured by its  capacity to extend the
number of people who can say “I” and then refer to themselves in a self-actualizing
manner.
67 It goes without saying that, from a normative point of view, this “schmittian-like” logic of
witchcraft is at the opposite of the public inquiry which, for pragmatic philosophers such
as Dewey, allows people to distance themselves from institutional systems and to recover
the individual and collective power of determining the orientations of the common life.
But is this normative appreciation of the moral and political implications of witchcraft
compatible  with  the  symmetrical  anthropology  pioneered  by  Favret-Saada?  This
question, very close to Boltanski’s reflections on critique where we started from, raises a
fundamental issue: the comprehensive description of a social phenomenon, based upon
the “experience-near” stance which is essential to understand what the “affected” go
through, cannot take into account its moral and political implications.31 As fine-grained
and demanding as they are, descriptive accounts seem then to be only the first step of
social and scientific inquiry. Sooner or later, they should be followed by a second step,
that  of  the  normative  assessment  of  the  moral  and  political  implications  of  the
phenomenon under scrutiny.
68 If  we  follow  John  Dewey  (1991  [1927]),  such  second-step,  normative  stance  is  fully
necessary in a social and scientific inquiry, which is ideally governed by what he calls
“the  method  of  democracy”  –  a  method  aiming  at  bringing  conflicts,  interests,  and
experiences  out  into  the  open  where  they  can  be  publicly  discussed,  judged  and
improved. Here again, this method is particularly well – and unintentionally, of course –
illustrated by the case of Loudun. Indeed, the “great public trial” which turns the relation
between the  sacred  and  the  profane  into  an  object  of  collective  inquiry  continually
expands,  up to and including the Princes of  the Church,  of  the State and inquisitive
laypeople. As the voice of the Devil makes its own’s way through the social circles, more
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and more wide-ranging, it changes status: from an impromptu, destructive, violent force,
it slowly becomes a civilized figure of speech. “With the possessed, the Devil speaks, he
writes. If I dare say so, he publishes” (Certeau 2000 [1970]: 8). The overcirculation of the
words of the demon takes them away from their authoritative sources and diminishes
their value: as an unsteady currency, they become more uncertain and, above all, more
human. Torn apart by divergent intellectual systems, indeed, they no longer belong to the
supernatural language, but are downgraded to human language and disputations. The
progressive weakening of the initial force of the Devil illustrates fantastically well the
potential  emancipatory  effect  of  publicity:  it  erodes  the  power  of  totalization  that
enclosed phenomena tend to entail. Once open to public scrutiny, the force of totalization
can hardly  endure,  and  this  is  why  public  inquiry,  either  social  or  scientific,  is  the
mainstay of democracy in the normative, ideal sense of the term.
69 As seen above, witchcraft in the Bocage appears as an anti-democratic problem solving,
an  “anti-public”  grammar  that  is  not  held  accountable  for  its  moral  and  political
consequences  by  the  actors  themselves.  So,  in  this  case,  some  sort  of  “external”
standpoint of the social scientist is needed: only such standpoint can show that witchcraft
is not solely the site of validation of the social fate of the alleged victim, but also the site
of exclusion of the ostracized witch. How is it possible, then, to critically reveal the ill-
formed  moral  and  political  constitution  of  witchcraft  without  giving  up  on  the
endogenous stance of the ethnographer? How to reach, in this context, the “broadened
way of thinking” or “enlarged mentality,” based upon the possible or actual judgment of
others,  which  ensures  a  publicly-minded,  universalizing  form  of  political  judgment
(Arendt 1982)?
 
Complex Exteriority or an Eye for Publicity?
The latter Boltanski (2011 [2009]) distinguishes two kinds of critical processes. The first
process, called “simple exteriority,” is internal to the activities of the social actors and able,
at best,  to address power issues;  to produce it,  the social  scientist simply follows and
describes what the actors are doing and how they assess their doings. The second process,
called “complex exteriority,” is external to the point of view of the people involved in social
action; as such, it is able to unveil domination, not by assessing some local activities, but by
producing  a  theoretical  critique of  the  social  order.  For,  unlike  power,  domination  is
invisible to the social actors and can only be revealed by the technical and theoretical
skills  of  the (critical)  social  scientist.  Boltanski  defines then this second operation as
metacritical in that it is able to produce a totalizing – as opposed to a partial – point of view
on reality (which is his concept for “social order”).
We  reach  here  the  heart  of  the  disagreement  between  Boltanski’s  metapragmatical
approach to critique vis-à-vis the more pragmatist one we tried to lay out by commenting
on Favret-Saada’s and especially Certeau’s work. Rather than opposing a simple exteriority
to a complex one, we would like to stress, along the lines of Dewey’s pragmatism and
Arendt’s phenomenology, the continuum between the internal points of view about an
action  or  event,  and  more  external  ones.  Such  a  continuum  is  a  feature  of  the
phenomenon itself, which is always open to both internal and external gazes and, by way
of consequence, to a plurality of perceptions – a plurality that is thus intrinsic to the
whole  phenomenon.  Interestingly,  in  Arendt’s  phenomenological  language,  the
distinction  between  the  internal  and  external  gaze  matches  up  with  the  distinction
between the stance of the actor and that of the spectator: “only the spectator occupies a
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position that enables him to see the whole; the actor, because he is part of the play, must
enact his part – he is partial by definition” (2006 [1961]: 55). Of course, the position of the
spectator varies and can go from that of the impartial judge attending an event to the
judgment of history but, in any case, it is the spectator’s view that “carrie[s] the ultimate
meaning of the event.”32 Such understanding is very similar to Dewey’s experimental
conception of the public:  the public arises when individuals,  indirectly affected by the
consequences of others’ actions, perceive those effects and gather together in order to
secure or avoid them.33 Even though Arendt’s spectator seems less politically active than
Dewey’s public, both authors posit that the nature of a phenomenon exceeds the internal
point of view of the actors, and that the third party perspective is consubstantial with it.
It is precisely this “openness to the third” that allows the inquirer to remain faithful to
the  nature  of  the  phenomenon  without  automatically  endorsing  the  actors’
commitments.  Since  the  critical  point  of  view  is  already  built  in the  phenomenon,
normative  critique  does  not  require  radical  exteriority,  contrary  to  what  Boltanski’s
approach problematically suggests. Indeed, the dichotomy that Boltanski posits between
simple and external exteriority breaks the unity of the phenomenon and separates the
direct  elements  of  the  phenomenon  (the  actors’  points  of  view)  from their  indirect
counterparts (the public’s points of view). This leads to a second difficulty: since direct
and indirect  elements have been disconnected,  the third point  of  view linked to the
indirect  consequences  of  the  phenomenon has  been obliterated,  forcing Boltanksi  to
reintroduce  it  under  the  form  of  an  alien critical  point  of  view:  that  of  the
metapragmatical critique. The problem is that, as Dewey put it, such critical move, far
from being emancipating, is alienating, for the ideological – hence, dogmatic – critique
that  it  advocates  is  disconnected  from the  real  consequences  of  the  phenomenon.34
Paradoxically, such disconnection severs the link between the phenomenon and social
action, and prevents the actors or the public from acting upon its effective consequences.
Rather than empowering people, such critical stance deprives them of their capacity to
act in an appropriate manner, and replaces social inquiry with an ideological construct.
But there is a third – and somehow more disturbing – criticism that can be addressed to
Boltanski’s position. According to the author, a metacritical point of view, which provides
a totalizing perspective on reality, is necessary to deconstruct the reigning social order.
However, it is far from certain that such a totalizing perspective is neither needed nor
desirable, for it might rapidly degenerate into a totalitarian point of view, hostile as such
to a critical  pluralism.35 A totalizing perspective – especially one that severs the link
between the direct and indirect consequences of a phenomenon – risks turning into a
unique,  arbitrary  claim that  bypasses  the  pluralistic  composition  of  society  and  the
multiplicity of opinions. 
70 Our criticism to Boltanski’s new sociology allows us to better specify the more pragmatist
approach we advocate here.  The puzzle  produced by the articulation of  the internal
description of a phenomenon with its normative assessment, which make it accountable
vis-à-vis the rest of society, can indeed be solved through pragmatist means. In concrete
terms, the solution, ethnographically and normatively correct, is to follow the direct and
indirect consequences of a phenomenon, to lift the ban of enunciation and to map out as
many points of views as possible – including, in our witchcraft cases, the point of view of
the alleged sorcerer (or witch) and that of the official authorities. This is the only way to
increase the range of the possible views of the phenomenon and, thereby, to render the
scope of the thought as general and pluralist as possible. Such a way to proceed will
preserve the unity of the phenomenon: while acknowledging the diverse – and critical –
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perspectives that it offers to scrutiny, from the actors to the public to the social scientist,
it nevertheless embraces them with an overall pragmatist account.
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NOTES
1. Among  others:  Marc Breviglieri,  Damien de  Blic,  Nicolas Dodier,  Cyril Lemieux,
Dominique Linhardt, Jean-Philippe Heurtin, Joan Stavo-Debauge, Danny Trom.
2. See Bénatouïl (1999a: 2), and Lemieux (2007: 192).
3. For notable exceptions, see Claverie 1994, 1998, and Thévenot 2011.
4. The model of Thévenot goes in this direction, though. 
5. Those social scientists came from different horizons, but converged on an editorial project,
starting in 1990, a journal entitled Raisons Pratiques [practical reasons], published by the École des
hautes  études  en  sciences  sociales  [EHESS]  of  Paris.  Daniel Cefaï,  Bernard Conein,
Élisabeth Claverie, Bruno Latour, Louis Quéré, Laurent Thévenot, Jean Widmer and others, have
played a very important role in this enterprise.
6. Latour himself defines his sociology as being “half Garfinkel and half Greimas” (2005: 54).
7. See also Bénatouïl 1999b, and Boltanski (1999 [1993]).
8. About this primacy, see Frega & Carreira da Silva 2011.
9. To  our  knowledge,  Putnam  is  not  quoted  by  pragmatic  sociologists  such  as  Thévenot  or
Boltanski; but it seems to us that his “internal realism” fits very well the ontological premises of
their framework.
10. On this resistance, inspired by the work of Mead, see Franks & Seeburger 1980.
11. On these two kinds of metaphysics, see Strawson 1992.
12. On this issue, see Kaufmann 2012, Stavo-Debauge 2011.
13. See de Certeau 1985.
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14. Of  course,  for  an  historian,  the  task  is  particularly  challenging,  if  not  impossible.  For
M. de Certeau (1988a [1975]), the writing of history has to face the tragic loss of those practices,
experiences and affects that, yesterday, were alive, and are dead today, a loss that the act of
writing tries to ward off, converting what is lost into a text. Thus the text of archives is a first
trace of the past that a second text, the text written by the historian, reinstates in a meaningful
relationship with the present by imposing the – sometimes wrong – unity and coherence of
discourse upon the heterogeneity of life as it was actually experienced in the past. Paradoxically,
hence, past life can survive only if it is captured in a system of representation and knowledge
that has, thereby, the indispensable and painful “beauty of the dead.”
15. In 1970s, a Normand landowner is always a man for reasons related to the procedures of
property transmission. Therefore, when evoking him, we will use the masculine.
16. Usually, Favret-Saada describes women in the position of the unwitcher. Therefore, we will
use a feminine pronoun to designate that role.
17. One finds the same idea in the work of the anthropologist Albert Piette (2003).
18. On the “conducts without beliefs,” see the well-known paper of Paul Veyne (1988).
19. Cases are documented in Denmark, England, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and, for
France, mostly in its northern regions. Spain and Italy will be spared (Certeau 2000 [1970]: 5).
20. See Certeau’s discussion of witchcraft (2005).
21. “The discourse of  possession turns on an absent  figure whom it  gradually  renders more
precise: the sorcerer. Contrary to what one might suppose, the theatre at Loudun is not provoked
by that formidable or fantastic figure. It is not determined by his approach or his visibility. It
needs him in order to function. Thus, as it organizes itself for itself, developing and refining its
procedures,  it  defines the silhouette,  the name,  the misdeeds of  the ‘possessor,’  upon whom
possession depends” (Certeau 2000 [1970]: 52).
22. Credibility is  a  key concept in Certeau’s  thinking that has to do with “the machinery of
representation”. In The Practice of everyday, the author states: “The credibility of a discourse is
[both] what moves believers and leads them up the garden path” (our translation) – and not, as
the English translation puts it: “what first makes believers act in accord with it [the discourse]”
(Certeau 2011 [1980]: 148). There is always an ambiguous element in credibility, especially when
that credibility works as a foundation for the social order.
23. For a similar approach in sociology deeply influenced by ethnomethodology, see the work of
Jean Widmer (2010).
24. Certeau  does  not  systematize  nor  make  an  important  use  of  the  concept  of  grammar.
Nonetheless our utilization seems consistent with his way of understanding it: “What makes the
discourse of possession possible […] is that the nun must not remember what happened, that no
personal  element  be  permitted  to  compromise  the  automatic  functioning  of  the  diabolical
grammar” (Certeau 2000 [1970]: 40).
25. As  Certeau (1981)  reflects  on  trust  and  credibility,  he  will  resort  on  the  etymological
properties and the semantic field of “credit,” with its economic overtones. See also Chapter XIII
of  The  Practice  of  Everyday  Life  (2011  [1980])  originally  entitled  “Political  Credibilities”  [
Crédibilités politiques], “Believing and Making People Believe” in English.
26. Certeau draws those postulates from the relationship between the modern psychiatrist and
the insane, a parallel that the author applies to the cases of possessions.
27. In  Certeau’s  framework,  thus,  experience is  definitely  the two-sided entity  that  we have
outlined in our introductive part: the structuring, objective power of grammar, both enabling
and  constraining,  does  have  a  phenomenological,  subjective  counterpart,  mostly  revealed  in
singular “ways of doing.”
28. See Sacks 1974; J. Widmer 2001; and P. Gonzalez 2006, 2010 about the normative character of
descriptive devices.
29. See Favret-Saada 1971.
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30. See Arendt’s phenomenological account about how objectivity and reality are closely tied to
publicity: “[public] means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by
everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us, appearance – something that is being
seen and heard by others as well as ourselves – constitutes reality” (Arendt 1998 [1958]:  50).
Arendt clearly distinguishes between the political plurality of opinions and the multiple tests
that a scientific statement or fact must pass in order to be established as true: “Truth in the
sciences is  dependent on the experiment that can be repeated by others;  it  requires general
validity” (1982: 40). See also her important essay on “Truth and Politics” (2006 [1961]).
31. About “experience-near,” see Geertz l975.
32. “The spectator, because he is not involved, can perceive this design of providence or nature,
which is hidden from the actor. So we have the spectacle and the spectator on one side, the
actors  and all  the  single  events  and contingent,  haphazard happenings  on the other.  In  the
context of the French Revolution, it seemed to Kant that the spectator’s view carried the ultimate
meaning  of  the  event,  although  this  view  yielded  no  maximum  for  acting”  (Arendt  2006
[1961]: 52).
33. “We  take  then  our  point  of  departure  from  the  objective  fact  that  human  acts  have
consequences  upon  others,  that  some  of  these  consequences  are  perceived,  and  that  their
perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences and
avoid others. Following this clew, we are led to remark that the consequences are of two kinds,
those which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and those which affect others
beyond those immediately concerned.  In this  distinction we find the germ of the distinction
between the private and the public.  When indirect consequences are recognized and there is
effort to regulate them, something having the traits of a state comes into existence” (Dewey 1991
[1927]: 12).
34. Dewey provides a point of method about the use of theory: “Political theories have shared in
the absolutistic character of philosophy generally. By this is meant something much more than
philosophies of the Absolute. Even professedly empirical philosophies have assumed a certain
finality and foreverness in their theories which may be expressed by saying that they have been
non-historical in character. They have isolated their subject-matter from its connections, and
any isolated subject-matter becomes unqualified in the degree of its disconnection” (1991 [1927]:
194-5).
35. Again, see Stavo-Debauge 2011, and Kaufmann 2012.
ABSTRACTS
Although  diverse  and  sometimes  diverging,  different  approaches,  from  “pragmatic”  to
“pragmatist” to “praxeological,” have an important feature in common: the social order is said to
be the practical accomplishment of ordinary agents who constitute and maintain in common the
world  they  live  in.  After  presenting  the  milestones  of  the  main  sociological  version  of
pragmatism, that is, pragmatic sociology (sociologie pragmatique), initiated by Luc Boltanski and
Laurent Thévenot, this paper will dwell on the complicated relationship between a pragmatic
framework, centered on the insider point of view of agents and social critique, which apprehends
the  social  world  from  the  external  point  of  view  of  the  critical  sociologist.  To  tackle  such
problematic relationship, we will dwell on two groundbreaking contributions to the “pragmatic
turn” in the social sciences, that of Jeanne Favret-Saada’s work on contemporary witchcraft, and
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Michel de Certeau’s  study  on  17th Century  possessions.  They  will  allow  us  to show  that  the
revival of the epistemological break is not a necessary step towards political awareness and that
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